Reuters: Secret network of 5,000 entities helps Iran import missile, drone equipment

A Reuters review of thousands of banking records, government documents, corporate filings, and import data has uncovered a secret military and financial network of more than 5,000 entities linked to Iran’s Ministry of Defense. Through this network, Tehran has imported equipment, explosives, and components for missiles and drones, as well as heavy trucks that can serve as mobile launch platforms, worth at least $2 billion since January 2025, despite Western sanctions and a U.S. maritime blockade.

The records show shipments continued to reach Iran during the war via land, sea, and air routes. Much of the equipment originated from China, Russia, Germany, and other parts of the European Union. One entity, named “Vaja 346428,” alone imported military hardware valued at about $2.3 billion from January 2025 to June 2026.

This network, with units linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and semi-governmental commercial foundations known as “Bonyads,” provides a parallel channel for Iranian military procurement. It relies on front companies, foreign intermediaries, and financial settlements that do not require cross-border money transfers, according to the Reuters investigation in collaboration with U.S.-Israeli risk consultancy 240 Analytics.

Meyad Maleki, a former U.S. Treasury official who helped design American sanctions on Iran, said: “What we see here is the regime’s military lifeline during this conflict and for many years before. This is the entire integrated business system of the Iranian military.”

Procurement network with unified names and numbers

Entities identified in the investigation have names beginning with “Vaja,” an acronym for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. All share a single address in Tehran, matching the ministry’s, and list a founding date of February 11, 1979—the day Ayatollah Khomeini took power after the Shah’s ouster.

However, records indicate most of these entities were actually established in 2013, when Iran faced sanctions that slashed its crude oil exports and collapsed its currency.

The network employs foreign front individuals and companies, known as “trustees,” who use proceeds from illicit oil sales to purchase goods on behalf of the Islamic Republic. Senior military leaders involved in Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs benefit from this mechanism.

Reuters found no evidence that any of the entities identified in the documents are listed on Western sanctions rolls, despite the Iranian military being subject to multiple U.S. sanctions for decades.

State-owned Bank Sepah records show that phone numbers registered to 91 of these entities appeared in banking records for IRGC members with accounts at the bank, including at least two commanders accused by the U.S. of abuses against civilian protesters.

The investigation found these entities form a vast procurement and sanctions-evasion system, with transactions not limited to importing equipment but also involving the movement of funds inside and outside Iran. Import data showed that 97 percent of reviewed shipments were settled “without money transfer.”

According to Maleki, this mechanism allows Iran to use proceeds from illicit overseas oil sales to buy military equipment without transferring funds across borders for each deal, reducing the chance of detection for sanctions-related transactions.

Trusted Iranian intermediaries based abroad purchase goods using funds held in foreign banks, then ship them to Iran. Beneficiaries include the military unit overseeing ballistic missile programs and Tondar Sahara (Desert Thunder), which was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2024 for manufacturing and supplying drones to Russia for use in the Ukraine war.

How the network was uncovered

Noam Benstock, lead analyst at 240 Analytics, began tracking these entities in June 2025 after downloading thousands of pages of Bank Sepah documents freely available on the “Wiki Iran” website. His company compiles terrorism risk and financing data for businesses and governments, offering partner and client verification services.

Bank Sepah is the Iranian bank responsible for paying IRGC salaries and pensions. A group called “Code Breakers” claimed responsibility for hacking the bank and later for other breaches of Iranian government data. The bank did not respond to Reuters’ request for comment on the breach.

Wiki Iran, which publishes leaked documents from the Islamic Republic, told Reuters: “We can confirm the materials are authentic and their source has been verified through our contacts inside and outside Iran.” Reuters could not determine the site’s operators, who say they are government opponents forced into exile.

While reviewing the documents, Benstock noticed thousands of bank accounts registered to entities with the same naming pattern—“Vaja” followed by a five- or six-digit number in letters—sharing the same registration date and address.

Bank records also listed account holders’ names, ID numbers, and balances. Benstock found that 36 entities in the network had foreign currency accounts totaling $1.2 billion at the end of 2024, while the rest held about $1.8 billion in local currency, averaging roughly $360,000 per account.

Benstock paused the project while working on his PhD, his job, and caring for his newborn, before resuming in August 2026 to review newer documents. He discovered the same entities were receiving funds from smuggled oil sales and buying large quantities of dual-use equipment.

Benstock said: “That was the breakthrough that made me realize the true scale of what we were looking at, and to find actual examples of imports... That’s when I realized we’d found something really big.”

Each entity had a unique 11-digit government ID and was listed in Iran’s official commercial registry, which contains thousands of companies. These numbers appeared on shipping documents, invoices, and bank accounts, enabling tracking even when front companies were used.

After identifying the pattern, 240 Analytics contacted Reuters to help map the network. Using the ID numbers Benstock provided, Reuters reviewed confidential shipping documents, import data, company records, emails, and documents collected by the site.

Benstock, 35, said: “These numbered entities are the hidden infrastructure of the Islamic Republic’s network for circumventing international sanctions—and much more. The volume of money flowing through them is astonishing, and no one had noticed before.”

“Vaja 346428”: a key procurement hub

The entity “Vaja 346428” emerged as one of the network’s top importers, with traceable purchases dating back to 2016. Its foreign procurement rose from $442 million in the twelve months ending March 2023 to $989 million in the following year, according to customs statistics published by Iranian media, making it one of Iran’s top ten importers.

Import Genius, a platform specializing in import-export data, recorded the entity importing $2.3 billion in military hardware between January 2025 and June 2026.

From January to April 2025, it imported 886 tons of chemicals via the Bandar Abbas port complex. The data showed the shipment originated in China and was classified under a tariff code covering sodium chlorate and other perchlorates—key raw materials for solid rocket fuel.

Three days after the last shipment arrived, an explosion occurred at the port on April 26, 2025, killing at least 70 people and injuring more than 1,200. Two sources familiar with the blast said it was caused by sodium perchlorate igniting inside shipping containers on the dock.

Iranian state media reported that Sina Port and Marine Services Company was storing the chemicals. The company is owned by the Mostazafan Foundation, a multibillion-dollar entity under the direct control of Iran’s Supreme Leader.

Sina’s CEO at the time said the explosion resulted from “incorrect information” about the shipment’s contents, which was delivered “without documents or identification tags.” Reuters could not determine if the 75 tons of chemicals caused the blast.

The U.S. sanctioned the Mostazafan Foundation in 2000. While it presents itself as a charity for the poor, the U.S. Treasury said it is used by the Supreme Leader to enrich his office and reward allies.

Hossein Dehghan heads the foundation. He was appointed defense minister in 2013, when most of the entities identified in the investigation began operating, and served for four years. Previously, he led IRGC forces in Lebanon during the 1983 Beirut bombing of international peacekeepers, which killed 241 U.S. servicemen, 58 French paratroopers, and Lebanese civilians, according to a U.S. sanctions statement. The U.S. held Iran responsible for the attack.

Dehghan did not respond to a request for comment about the explosion, the ministry-linked entities, or his role, sent via the foundation and its legal representative.

Rocket fuel, explosives, and manufacturing machinery

Procurements were not limited to chemicals for rocket fuel; they included $1.9 million worth of detonators in the first half of 2026, tons of explosives, aircraft engine parts, rocket fuel components, and heavy launch vehicles.

Weapons and sanctions experts who reviewed the findings said these materials could be used to manufacture and launch ballistic missiles and drones, including Shahed drones. Peter Salisbury, adjunct assistant professor at Columbia University who has studied Iranian arms transfers and supply chains, said the imports reflect an effort to renew the arsenal.

Salisbury said: “This appears to be a broad effort to rebuild or expand Iran’s current arsenal” of drones and missiles. “These data clearly show the Iranian system’s ability to adapt and find new pathways.”

Salisbury and another weapons expert said they had previously used Wiki Iran data and found it accurate. Maleki was one of four Iran sanctions and weapons experts who reviewed the Reuters findings and confirmed that much of the material could be used in missile and drone programs.

In addition to individual components, Iran purchased precision machinery that can be used to manufacture military equipment, including advanced computer-controlled lathes, electron-beam furnaces, and particle accelerators, according to import data through June 2026. These are used in industry and can also be employed to make missile and drone bodies.

Data show nearly all materials imported by Iran were exempt from customs duties and specifically classified as military equipment. However, experts noted that many imports, including explosives, can be considered dual-use goods with potential civilian applications.

Reuters reviewed part of some 19,000 import records, cross-referencing them with shipping documents, social media videos, and official media reports. Not all data included detailed shipment descriptions, and the investigation often relied on customs codes to identify contents and declared origins without independent verification.

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